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Abstract
We model the emergence of organization forms in a game between
prospective entrepreneurs. Complementary roles arise endogenously
in a way that admits a stable assignment of workers to rms. This con-
trasts with existing work on job matching, where stability typically re-
quires workers to be substitutes. Our approach demonstrates that the
labor market selection of entrepreneurs and their prot-maximizing
choices lead to specic technologies in which certain workers are sub-
stitutes and others are complements. We give a simple characteri-
zation of equilibrium rm memberships and organizations. We show
that payo¤s in our non-cooperative solution lie in the core of the cor-
responding cooperative game, and can be obtained in a decentralized
process that reduces information and planning requirements for the
entrepreneur.
How rms are formed is still imperfectly understood. Stable matchings
of workers to employers have only been shown to exist when complementar-
ities between workers are ruled out or severely restricted. We take the view
that complement and substitute relationships in rms are not arbitrary or
exogenous. They arise from the technology choices of entrepreneurs, who
have an incentive (and face competitive pressure) to implement optimal or-
ganizations. In this paper, we derive under conditions of perfect information
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what these equilibrium organizations are, and we show that a unique stable
assignment of workers to rms exists.
In standard job matching models, workers are exogenously substitutes
(Kelso and Crawford [10], Martinez et al. [16] and [17], Hateld and Mil-
grom [8], Hateld and Kojima [7]).1 I.e. the value of an additional worker to
a rm declines whenever it makes a hire. Complementarity has been intro-
duced through economies of scale that depend only on the number of workers
the rm employs (Farrell and Scotchmer [6]) and through supermodularity
(Sherstyuk [22]).2 A new hire makes existing employees more valuable, and
the size of the externality increases with every additional worker. Then no
two workers are substitutes, and the symmetric nature of the complementar-
ity raises the question whether rms would merge if they were not exogenous.
In this literature, rms are at. Our rms are hierarchies: workers are not
only hired into a rm, but also into a role with a level a seniority. Complement
e¤ects arise across levels (between an employee and his or her superior),
while substitute e¤ects arise at the same level. For a building company, for
instance, di¤erent architects may be substitutes, whereas an architect and a
construction worker are complements.
We associate every (ordered) pair of individuals (i; j) with a value vij that
j can create if assigned to i in a rms organization. In this case, we think
of i as js manager, and the pair is complementary. Hiring h to replace i
as js manager reduces is value to the rm, so that h and i are substitutes.
(I.e. substitutes arise from the constraint that a worker must have a unique
manager.) Whether a given pair are complements or substitutes is an aspect
1In the salary adjustment process Kelso and Crawford [10] analyze, the best o¤er to
a given worker must be repeated in the following round, while others may raise their
bids. The central premise behind this approach is that rms will not want to withdraw a
successful o¤er to one worker when competition for other workers intensies. Hence the
workers value to the rm must not be diminished if co-workers are lost. Crawford and
Knoer [2] assume that employee productivity is invariant to who else joins the rm. Kelso
and Crawford [10] generalized to the "gross substitutes" property, which is imposed in a
number of subsequent studies (e.g. Roth [20] and Ma [15]). In the Kelso and Crawford
denition, workers are gross substitutes if higher salary o¤ers to one do not adversely
a¤ect rmswillingness to hire the other.
2A related kind of complementarity appears in Kremers [12] model of interdependent
production tasks. Here, the likelihood of completing a job successfully increases in the
skill of co-workers at their roles. A skilled individual bestows a symmetric externality on
all colleagues. One implication that is not echoed in our model is that similarly skilled
individuals tend to be hired into the same rms.
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of the equilibrium organization technology, not a fundamental property.3
The organization with its levels and roles is created by an entrepreneur
such that complementarities are maximized. The entrepreneur implicitly
hires him- or herself into the role at the top. Because individuals are not
uniformly suited to work together and manage, the rms protability de-
pends on how each role is sta¤ed, and in particular on the identity of the
entrepreneur. Protability under di¤erent sta¢ ng scenarios determines the
wage o¤ers a prospective entrepreneur can make, and thus whether he or
she is ultimately successful in recruiting a workforce and starting a rm.
Entrepreneurs are therefore also determined endogenously.
The managerial hierarchy is reminiscent of Rosens [19] rms, in which
the most skilled individuals are employed as managers and confer produc-
tive externalities on lower-level workers. A key di¤erence with us is that the
externality in Rosen depends only on the identity of the manager, not the
worker. In fact, our agents cannot necessarily be ranked by "skill," since com-
plementarities are specic to pairs. Two individuals may be highly e¤ective
managers in most cases, but not work well with each other. However, Rosens
explanation of high salaries for top managers, stemming from these hierar-
chical complementarities, partially carries over, since rms have an incentive
to assign managers selectively to make them as productive as possible.4
Our approach is broadly in the spirit of Zames [24] general-equilibrium
framework with rm formation, built on earlier work with Ellickson et al. [5],
3Pycia [18] derives a stable matching with complementarities if the equilibrium satises
pairwise alignment: two members of a rm jointly benet or jointly lose from adding any
group of workers. This is a property of equilibrium payo¤s that are, in Pycias model (not
ours), determined after workers are matched to rms. It does not hold in our setting,
which di¤ers in several respects (e.g. endogenous rms).
4It is worth pointing out how we di¤er from work on constrained cooperative games,
where a network or hierarchy may determine which coalitions can form, or block alloca-
tions from the core. In Derks and Gilles [3], hierarchies imply veto rights for superiors
against coalitions that subordinates might wish to enter into. Our agents join organizations
voluntarily, and their powers to deviate are not in any way restricted.
Legros and Newman [14] also explained organization form and membership in rms. In
their context, the organization form is a response to moral hazard: rms have a choice
between investing in monitoring technology (M -rms) and writing incentive-compatible
contracts (I-rms). We do not treat agency problems explicitly, and we refer to organiza-
tion in another sense, as an assignment of employees to managers. Legros and Newmans
setting is a risky world where rms have to borrow against the individual wealth of their
members. We assume, in the tradition of Crawford and Knoer, that the value any hypo-
thetical rm could create is known, so that funding issues do not arise.
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which is not explicit about the process. He takes a feasible set of rm types
as given. A rm is dened by the roles its workers need to ll, a stochas-
tic production technology that depends on workersskills and actions, and
a contract that allocates net output among the workers. Workers may also
make zero-sum transfers (wage payments) among themselves. A rm comes
into existence when, in equilibrium, every role attracts an agent with appro-
priate skills. Hence, the agents coordinate on the equilibrium rm structure
through their job choices. In Zame, there is no rm-building through personal
initiative and no explicit mechanism through which coordination occurs. Our
model casts every individual as a potential rm-builder, and the equilibrium
rm structure as the outcome of active bidding for labor services.5
The next section describes the model, assumptions about valuations, and
the nature of equilibrium. The valuations we admit include anything that
could be derived from a spatial model, where agents are associated with
points in Rn (e.g. professional characteristics), and the value one individual
can create under anothers management declines in the interpersonal dis-
tance. Then we discuss the membership and organization of equilibrium
rms. They can be obtained from valuations by a simple algorithm. The
third section gives a solution for the equilibrium payo¤s and shows that it
belongs to the core of the corresponding TU game. An example in terms
of spatial valuations is given in the fourth section. We discuss the nature
of complements and substitutes. Last, we consider the possibility of decen-
tralization: a network game that implements the equilibrium organization
structures without coordinated hiring by entrepreneurs. Proofs are collected
in the appendix.
5If we view our rms from Zames perspective, then entrepreneuris one of the roles
each rm has to ll. The contract gives the entrepreneur a claim to all output, which can be
valued at the equilibrium goods prices and treated as prot. In return, the entrepreneur
transfers a sum to the other workers that is divided into wage payments for each role.
Every role has a specic skill requirement and associated action. Our rm types can be
described as sets of skills / actions that an entrepreneur may buy in the labor market. In
contrast with Zame, these rms are subsets of a nite population, hence not necessarily
small relative to the market, and their output is deterministic. We abstract from the
interaction between rm formation and the goods markets, and we sidestep the moral
hazard and adverse selection issues discussed by Zame. Hence we also do not concern
ourselves with e¤ects of hiring on the competitive structure of goods markets, as in Sasaki
and Toda [21].
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1 Economy
In a nite population N , every individual i is assumed to have an exogenous
valuation vij 2 R+ for the labor services of any other individual j. The
valuation refers to the prot (before wages) that j can generate under is
management.
Assumption (A1): Exogeneity. For a given pair of agents i; j 2 N ,
vij 2 R+ is constant.
Specically, js productivity under i is not a¤ected by how many, and
which, other individuals i manages, or by who manages i. It also does not
depend on the wage j is paid. Nevertheless, A1 is not at odds with the
principal-agent problem. The valuations may reect, in addition to js skill
at the job and is skill at designing tasks, how willingly j exerts e¤ort and
how well i monitors. If e¤ort were unobservable, vij could be interpreted as
js expected performance under the optimal contract.6
We rule out equal valuations for the same person in the interest of e¢ cient
notation. (But one may have the same valuations for others.) The restriction
is plausible if valuations are drawn from a continuous distribution. It does
implies that, for everyone, there is someone with a strictly positive valuation
for their services.
Assumption (A2): Uniqueness. For all i; j; k 2 N , vik = vjk only if
i = j.
If j creates more value under is management than working independently,
then perhaps i is more knowledgeable about the task they perform. This
reading suggests that j is not an e¤ective manager for i. We extend this
logic to chains vij  vjj; vjk  vkk; : : : ; vlm  vmm. We require that the rst
agent creates more value independently than under the management of the
last, i.e. vii  vmi.7
6This interpretation can be supported as long as the expected wage cost of inducing a
given increase in vij varies only with j, but not with the identity of the manager i.
7A3 could be replaced by a stronger "positive agency cost" axiom: for all i; j 2 N ,
vii  vij , i.e. i can manage self more e¤ectively than others. This statement implies A3,
e.g. vij  vjj and vjk  vkk lead to vii  vij  vjj  vjk  vkk  vki. Positive agency cost
is plausible when management is top-down (i sets tasks for j without seeking js advice),
and delegation may result in a loss from communication barriers and partial e¤ort. The
role of j is then merely to carry out instructions as closely as possible.
In applications, it may be meaningful to infer valuations from distances between points
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Assumption (A3): Noncircularity. For any indexing t : N ! f1; 2; : : : ; ng
of agents, if vt(t+1)  v(t+1)(t+1) for all t  T , then v11  v(T+1)1.
In this paper, we treat valuations as public information.8
Assumption (A4): Informedness. Valuations fvijgi;j2N are common
knowledge.
The valuations are the the economys data. Now we dene strategy spaces
and our equilibrium notion, which is a renement of Nashs. A manager
assignment is a function ri : N  2N ! N such that ri (j; C) 2 C. It
identies whom (in C) i would assign to manage j 2 C.9 Let Ri be the set
of such functions. Wage o¤ers are a function wi : N ! R+ that species a
bid for everyones labor services (including is own). Let Wi be the set of
such functions. Employer choice is a function ei : Rn+ ! N which names, for
every prole of o¤ers w1 (i) ; w2 (i) ; : : : ; wn (i) to i, the bidder j 2 N whose
o¤er is accepted (possibly j = i). Let Ei be the set of such functions.10
associated with the individuals. These points could be attributes in a social or professional
characteristics space, where distances represent communication barriers or skill mismatch.
Positive agency cost is satised by valuations that are spatial in the following sense: there
exists a mapping f : N ! Rl and a distance metric d : N  N ! R such that, for all
i; j; k 2 N , vij  vik if and only if d (f (i) ; f (j))  d (f (i) ; f (k)). To verify that positive
agency cost holds, note simply that d (f (i) ; f (i)) = 0  d (f (i) ; f (j)) for all j 2 N , so
that vii  vij .
The converse, that valuations consistent with "positive agency cost" are spatial, is not
true. For example, let (1) vii > vij > vik, (2) vjj > vjk > vji, (3) vkk > vki > vkj . While
(1) and (3) would imply d (f (i) ; f (j)) < d (f (i) ; f (k)) < d (f (j) ; f (k)), (2) requires
d (f (j) ; f (k)) < d (f (i) ; f (j)). By extension, A3 is also strictly more general than the
"spatial property."
8It is possible to decentralize the game, either as a matching process or network for-
mation game, and lessen information and coordination requirements.
9Notation is loose here. The domain of the function is implicity restricted to pairs
(i; C) 2 N  2N with i 2 C.
10Several properties are implicit in the domains of these functions. The assignment of
unique managers, in conjunction with non-circular valuations, implies that organization
charts are trees. Holding multiple jobs is ruled out. Employer choice, as we have dened
it, precludes a preference for working under specic managers. In practice, the best-paid
job is not always chosen. It may be desirable to work with the supervisor that makes
the agent most productive. (Dutta and Masso [4] study preferences over colleagues.) One
may prefer to be ones own boss. A network of social and family relations may a¤ect
the benets of a job. In our economy, social considerations are absent, i.e. job o¤ers are
evaluated only on wages.
A subtle restriction is hidden in the form of the wage o¤ers. In general, i would like to
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Given a strategy prole s 2 i2NSi (where Si = Ri Wi  Ei), a rm
Fi (s) consists of those inividuals who select i as their employer:
Fi (s) = fj 2 N s.t. ej (w) = ig :
Since everyone accepts exactly one wage o¤er, the collection of rms in the
economy is a partition of N . Some rms may well be empty: if Fi (s) = ?,
we will call i an employee; if Fi (s) 6= ?, i is an entrepreneur.
The prot that accrues to i is the di¤erence between value created (under
the manager assignment) and wages paid by Fi (s):
i (s) =
X
j2Fi(s)
vri(j;Fi(s))j  
X
j2Fi(s)
wi (j) : (1)
Note that the income of entrepreneurs, i.e. i 2 Fi (s), is invariant to the
wages they pay themselves: wi (i) + i (s) is constant with respect to wi (i).
Nevertheless, wage o¤ers to self matter in a technical sense: they determine
whether or not i becomes self-employed. The invariance applies only after
this choice is made.
Denition: Economy. The economy is a game   =

N; fvijgi;j2N ;i2NSi; fuigi2N

,
with strategy space Si = RiWiEi for each i 2 N , valuations that satisfy
A1-A4, and preferences represented by a utility function ui : R ! R+ that
increases monotonically in income wei(w) (i) + i (s) for all i 2 N .
We treat   as a normal-form game: strategies are chosen simultaneously;
in particular, every i 2 N plans the internal structure of any rm i may run,
makes wage o¤ers to all j 2 N , and decides how to select among wage o¤ers
i will receive.
A solution of   is a Nash equilibrium in undominated pure strategies that
leads to well-structured rms in a sense we will explain. Strategy si 2 Si is
undominated if there exists no s0i 2 Si such that ui (s0i; s i)  ui (si; s i) for
all s i 2 j2NnfigSj, and ui (s0i; s i) > ui (si; s i) for some s i 2 j2NnfigSj.
o¤er a schedule of wages to each j 2 N that depends on the o¤ers j is making. Then i
can reward j for competing less aggressively in the labor market. In particular, i would
prevent any employee j from making the best alternative bid for another of is employees
k, increasing ks bargaining power with i. To this end, i would o¤er j a higher wage if
j bids zero for k. Because we do not allow such tie-ins (by forcing o¤ers to be in R+),
competing bids for is employees may come from within is rm. Internal competition,
from potential spin-o¤s, is important in practice.
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That is, if si is not weakly dominated by, and in some situation strictly worse
than, another strategy.
The rationale for ruling out equilibria in (weakly) dominated strategies is
that agents can otherwise o¤er wages they are not prepared to pay, knowing
they will be outbid. Entrepreneurs would have to pay unreasonably high
wages - but might refuse to do so, in which case the overbidders would want
to withdraw their o¤ers. Such equilibria seem unstable.11
In principle, two employees of a rm could be assigned to manage them-
selves. This type of arrangement is problematic: no nal authority exists to
resolve coordination failures (admittedly, coordination is not required in the
strict connes of our model). One might conjecture that i, as the designer of
rm Fi (s), would not adopt such a structure, unless it is strictly protable to
do so. Hence we focus on equilibria where, in each rm, only one individual
reports to self. Moreover, in Fi (s), it seems reasonable that this individual
should be i.12
Denition: Hierarchical Assignment. Manager assignment ri is hierar-
chical if, for all i; j 2 N , ri (j; Fi (s)) = j only if i = j.
Hierarchical assignments will not be an assumption, but a renement
property of equilibria. We eliminate no strategies and require solutions to
be Nash equilibria on the full domain of the strategy space i2NSi.13 Not
joining Fi (s) or choosing a non-hierarchical assignment for Fi (s), which are
unilateral deviations for i, cannot be payo¤-improving at a solution for any
i 2 N .
Denition: Equilibrium. Strategy prole s 2 i2NSi is a (hierarchical)
equilibrium of   if, for every i 2 N , si is undominated, ri is hierarchical,
and ui
 
si ; s

 i
  ui  s0i; s i for all s0i 2 Si.
Even though we have not "forbidden" strategies that lead to negative
prots, it is easy to see that no agent can have a negative payo¤ in equilib-
11In English auctions, the private-values assumption prevents overbidding, since all bid-
ders believe they have a positive probability of winning.
12If we only impose that there is a unique individual, not necessarily i, who reports
to self in Fi (s), we get permutations of rm names. The membership and structure of
Fi (s) migrate to Fk (s) in alternate equilibria. Payo¤s are not a¤ected, but the division
of entrepreneurial incomes into wages and prots is then restricted.
13The reason is partly technical: since hierarchical assignment requires i 2 Fi (s) or
Fi (s) = ?, i could not make o¤ers without committing to be an entrepreneur if the
restriction were applied to the strategy space.
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rium. Everyone has the option to be self-employed in a one-man rm and
create non-negative value. Reservation wages are therefore non-negative; any
negative prot could only arise because an entrepreneur overpays himself. A
condition that forces prots to be non-negative could be introduced without
changing any aspect of the outcome, except how entrepreneurs allocate their
incomes between wages and prots.
2 Firms
Associated with an equilibrium s is a partition ofN into rms Fi (s). In this
section we derive the unique membership and organization of (hierarchical)
equilibrium rms. The requirement that equilibrium play is undominated
imposes a few specic constraints. First, entrepreneurs always assign the
best available manager to each employee. Second, workers join the rm that
makes the highest wage o¤er to them.14
Lemma (P1). For all i 2 N , si 2 Si is an undominated strategy only if:
(i) for all C  N and all j 2 C, ri (j; C) = h only if vhj  vkj for all k 2 C;
(ii) ei (w) = h 6= i only if wh (i)  wk (i) for all k 2 N n i.
Proof. p. 19.
Given the hierarchy requirement that only entrepreneurs can be assigned
to themselves, they must join their own rms if they hire any employees in
equilibrium.
Lemma (P2). For all i 2 N , if Fi (s) 6= ?, then i 2 Fi (s).
Proof. p. 20.
Intuitively, rms will be blocks of complementary individuals who can
create value, i.e. e¤ectively manage each other, independently of outsiders.
Equilibrium rms can be characterized in terms of the set of individuals for
whom i has the highest valuation (is the ideal manager),
Gi = fj 2 N s.t. vij  vkj for all k 2 Ng ;
14That is, individuals accept the highest wage conditional on becoming workers. It must
exceed a reservation level that reects the option to be self-employed and contribute to
value creation in ones own rm. Else, they become entrepreneurs and then may pay
themselves less than their "market wage."
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and its transitive closure,
Gi =

j 2 N s.t. j 2 Gi or, for some fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N ,
k1 2 Gi; k2 2 Gk1 ; : : : ; j 2 Gk

:
The latter is the set of individuals whose ideal manager is someone whose
ideal manager is someone ... whose ideal manager is i. The ideal assign-
ment of the entire population could be visualized as a group of trees, each
branching out from an individual who is her own ideal manager (a likely
entrepreneur) to members of "upper management" whose ideal manager is
an entrepreneur, to members of "middle management" whose ideal manager
is in upper management, etc. Gi contains everyone "under i," the subtree
that begins with i.
Lemma (P3). For all i; j; j0 2 N such that i 6= j 6= j0 6= i,
(i) Gi \Gj = ?;
(ii) Gi  Gi;
(iii) if j 2 Gi, then (a) i =2 Gj, (b) i =2 Gj, (c) j =2 Gj, (d) Gj  Gi;
(iv) Gi\ Gj = ? or Gi  Gj or Gj  Gi, and if j; j0 2 Gi, then Gj\ Gj0 = ?;
(v) Gi [
[
j2Gi
Gj = Gi.
Proof. p. 20.
If j belongs to the rm Fi (s) (where possibly i = j), then js comple-
mentary block Gj can create more value in Fi (s) than anywhere else, since
the ideal managers for members of Gj are themselves in Gj [ j. Hence, js
employer is able to make the highest bid for Gj.
Lemma (P4). For all i; j 2 N , if j 2 Fi (s), then Gj  Fi (s).
Proof. p. 21.
We can now describe membership in equilibrium rms in terms of the
complementary blocks.
Proposition (P5). For all i 2 N , either Fi (s) = ? or Fi (s) = Gi.
Proof. p. 22.
Nothing in P5 prevents rms from being empty. In particular, Fi (s) = ?
if i =2 Gi, i.e. (by P3ii) if i =2 Gi. The rms partition N since x 2 Gi and
i 2 Gi imply x 2 Gj only if Gj  Gi (by inductive application of P3iiid).
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The structure of the complementary blocks suggests a simple algorithm
to solve for equilibrium rms. We dene a function f 0 : N ! N that maps
to i 2 N the individual with the highest valuation for i.
f 0 (i) = j s.t. vji  vki for all k 2 N:
Iterations f t+1 (i) = f (f t (i)) successively assign to i the ideal manager, the
ideal manager of is ideal manager, etc. The sequence ff tgt2N converges
because N is nite and valuations are non-circular. Its limit, f1 = f t such
that f t = f t+1, ranges over the set of individuals who are their own ideal
managers. These are the entrepreneurs. One can express the rm run by i
as
Fi (s
) = fj 2 N s.t. f1 (j) = ig :
On the basis of P5, we can say more about the equilibrium organization of
rms. Since j 2 Fi (s) only if the largest complementary block that includes
j is in Fi (s), js ideal manager, k such that j 2 Gk, is available. P1 says
that k must then be chosen to manage j by all undominated strategies, hence
in any equilibrium.
Proposition (P6). In any equilibrium, for all i 2 N and j 2 Fi (s),
ri (j; Fi (s
)) = k such that j 2 Gk.
Proof. p. 23.
P6 is a prerequisite for e¢ ciency: the value any given rm creates in
equilibrium is the maximum it can achieve in any assignment of workers to
managers. Given the equilibrium rm structure, which exploits all comple-
mentarities, the economy operates e¢ ciently.
3 Payo¤s
Wages are not uniquely determined in equilibrium because entrepreneurs
have no preference between receiving their income in wages or prots, and
between di¤erent wage o¤er schemes that leave the rms prot una¤ected.
(Several are possible in equilibrium, as our example will show.) However, the
entrepreneursequilibrium incomes (wages and prots combined) are unique.
Let v(1)i; v(2)i; : : : denote the highest, second-highest, etc. valuation for i
in the population.
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Proposition (P7). There exists an equilibrium s where the wage o¤ers
accepted by i = 1; : : : ; N are
wei (w) (s
) = v(2)i +
X
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

:
Proof. p. 23.
The maximal value created by workers in Gj for the rm Fi (s) depends
solely on j; not on js manager, or even the entrepreneur i. Hence managers
must be paid the entire prot made under their supervision, since that prot
could be transferred to another rm. This is the principle underlying the
equilibrium wages.
It is not obvious, or necessarily true, that the entrepreneur cannot pay
some individuals a higher wage in equilibrium. The reason is that a wage
increase for a group of employees reduces its incentive to defect and may
therefore permit o¤setting wage decreases for other employees (who could
otherwise protably attract the group through a unilateral change in wage
o¤ers). Hence there is no reason to believe that the equilibrium wages are
unique.
Such redistributions must, however, leave the total wage bill of each equi-
librium rm unchanged. Which wage scheme to implement is a matter of
choice, not coincidence, given that the entrepreneur makes ultimatum o¤ers.
Because the equilibrium rm memberships are unique, any wage distribution
that reduces the total bill is strictly preferred by the entrepreneur and ap-
plied in equilibrium. Entrepreneurial incomes thus follow from P7 to be, in
any equilibrium,
wei (w) (i) + i (s
) = v(1)i +
X
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

for i 2 N with i 2 Fi (s).
Given that many related matching and rm-formation games are coopera-
tive, it is interest to make an explicit connection. In the (transferable-utility)
game
 
N; V : 2N ! R that corresponds to our non-cooperative game  ,
V (C) =
X
i2C
max
k2C
vki
is the characteristic value (coalition C can create by itself) for each C  N .
The allocation u = (u1; : : : ; un) 2 Rn is in the core if there is no "blocking"
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coalition that can guarantee every member a higher payo¤ (for some i 2 C
strictly higher). I.e. u is in the core if V (C) Pi2C ui for all C  N .
Proposition (P8). If s is an equilibrium of  , then u such that ui =
wei (w) (i) + i (s
) is in the core of the corresponding TU game.
Proof. p. 25.
4 Example
To derive specic valuations, consider a population of four individuals h, i,
j and k, who can be mapped to points in a two-dimensional space as in the
top left corner of Figure 1. If we think of the dimensions as representing
interest in sports and movies, then the minimum distance metric d (x; y) =
min (jx1   y1j ; jx2   y2j) quanties a pairs ability to small talk. Suppose
better socializers are also better collaborators, and the value the agent at y
creates under management by the agent at x is:
v (x; y) = a (x)  d (x; y) :
The function a measures management ability; its values are given in Figure
1 in parentheses beneath the locations of h, i, j and k.
On the right side of Figure 1, the distances and resulting valuations are
tabulated. Recall that the value of any agent y to potential employers varies
only with ys direct productivity vxy under the manager x assigned by the
employer. All indirect productivities that arise from workers the rm can
protably recruit and assign to y are available to any employer, once she
recruits y (since she will be the highest bidder for these workers). The com-
petition between potential employers demands that such gains are paid back
to y in wages. Thus, to determine who will hire x, we only need to consider
xs direct productivities under di¤erent managers, and identify the optimal
manager and his employer.
The optimal managers for h, i, j and k can be found in the columns of
Figure 1s valuation table. For h and i, the column maxima occur at h and i:
both are their own best managers. However, js maximum is at i, and ks at
j. Hence equilibrium hiring and internal organization is given by the graphs
in the lower left corner of Figure 1: h employs self; i employs j, k and self,
and assigns j as manager to k and self to j. The rm structure that emerges
is fhg, fi; j; kg with h and i entrepreneurs.
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1
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h
kj
i
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h
i
j
k
1
1
3/4
0
9/10
9/10
3/5
7/20
0
-1
4/5
11/20
3/5
-2/5
13/20
-1/10
Figure 1: Spatial example
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The wages h and i pay to themselves are immaterial, since they come out
of prots and leave the entrepreneurs total income unchanged. How much
does i have to o¤er j and k? Consider k rst. The only contribution k makes
to is rm is the direct one under js management, namely vjk = 13=20.
However, since i makes an ultimatum o¤er, he only needs to bid up to the
second-highest value k could create. This happens to be vik = 3=5, ks
productivity under is management.
At rst glance, it may seem odd that i is constrained by his own valuation
and pays vik, rather than 0. But note that, if i lowers his bid for k, it is j (not
i) who benets, since every potential employer of js would win the bid for k
at a lower price and must fully compensate j for the higher value added. If i
still wants to hire j, he must increase js o¤er by the exact amount by which
ks o¤er is reduced.15 Lowering the bid for k is therefore not an improvement
for i.
The argument extends generally to any scenario where an employee "with-
draws" an o¤er to a future colleague in order to manipulate the distribution
of value within the rm. If the entrepreneur took advantage of the situation
by cutting the wage o¤er to x, every employee whose managerial productivity
with x exceeds the revised wage for x experiences an increase in market value
equal to the cut. Necessarily, the best and second-best manager for x in the
population have to be among those whose market value increases; else, if one
of them does not belong to the rm, the entrepreneur cannot hire x at the
lower wage. But then the entrepreneur pays back at least twice the amount
he saves on x (if he is not the best or second-best manager for x himself), so
he will simply pass up the opportunity.
Thus ks wage is 3=5, which implies that j adds value vjk wi (k) = 1=20
through his management. This amount is transferable to any other employer
who would hire j and k, in particular to j who has the second-highest direct
valuation for his own services, vjj = 3=4. Clearly, i must o¤er j a wage of
3=4+ 1=20 = 4=5; else j would defect to become an entrepreneur and hire k.
This leaves a prot of vii+vij+vjk wi (i) wi (j) wi (k) = 21=20 wi (i) to
i; the total income is 21=20, slightly more than i could obtain independently.
Of course, hs prot is 1  wh (h), and total payment is 1.16
15Put di¤erently, the value created jointly by j and k is not a¤ected by is bidding
behavior. Thus, the total wage others are willing to pay for the package fj; kg is xed,
which implies that payo¤s can only be redistributed between the two.
16In principle, it is certainly possible that an employee (rather than the entrepreneur)
receives the highest income in the rm, if she adds su¢ cient value by managing people
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There are substitute and complement workers in rm fi; j; kg. For in-
stance, j and k are clearly complements, since each increases the value of
the other through their management relationship. But i and j are sub-
stitutes. The value j adds to rm fi; j; kg is the total value created by
fi; j; kg less the value of fi; kg, where k is optimally assigned to be man-
aged by i: vii + vij + vjk   vii   vik = 17=20. In rm fj; kg, j contributes
vjj + vjk   vkk = 7=5. Evidently, js value to the rm decreases if i is
present, so i is a substitute for j. The value added by i to rm fi; j; kg is
the value of fi; j; kg less that of fj; kg, with j optimally assigned to be self-
managed: vii + vij + vjk   vjj   vjk = 21=20. The value i adds to rm fi; kg
is vii + vik   vkk = 8=5. Hence is value to the rm decreases if j is present,
so that j is conversely a substitute for i.
5 Complements and Substitutes
The coexistence of substitute and complement workers is made possible
through the introduction of hierarchical organization forms. That it should
be so is quite intuitive: the di¤erent roles in a rm are complementary, real
substitutability only exists within a role. Two workers are complements in
our model if they interact at di¤erent levels of the hierarchy: one is assigned
to manage the other. On the other hand, they are substitutes if they compete
on the same level of the hierarchy: one can replace the other as manager of
a given group of employees.
Suppose rm h increases its wage o¤er for employee j of equilibrium rm
Fi (s
). In case the wage o¤er is large enough to attract j to Fh (s), the
e¤ect on an employee k 6= j of Fi (s) can be of two kinds: ks value added to
Fi (s
) may weakly increase (making j and k substitutes) or weakly decrease
(complements).
If k leaves Fi (s), then the value created by the group Gk  Fi (s) is
diminished, since k is the best manager for its members. Also, the value
of j 2 Fi (s) such that k 2 Gj is diminished, since j is no longer required
as the best manager for k. These are complement e¤ects. On the other
hand, j could replace k as managers for the individuals in Gk, if j has the
second-highest direct valuation for such an individual within the rm. This
is a substitute e¤ect.
directly.
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More precisely, the value of worker j to entrepreneur i is
Vifjg (s) =
X
k2Fi(s)[fjg
max
l2Fi(s)[fjg
vlk  
X
k2Fi(s)nfjg
max
l2Fi(s)nfjg
vlk
= max
l2Fi(s)[fjg
vlj| {z }
I
+
X
k2Fi(s)nfjg
0BB@ maxl2Fi(s)[fjg vlk   maxl2Fi(s)nfjg vlk| {z }
II
1CCA :(2)
Term I is the source of the complement e¤ect: losing k 2 Fi (s) can lower
the direct value of j to i if k was js best manager. Both k and j will su¤er
wage reductions if they do not join the same rm. Term II is the source of
the substitute e¤ect: losing k can increase the indirect value of j to i, if j
replaces k as the best manager for someone. As a result, j can command a
higher wage in a rm without k.
If complementarity is too strong, rms may "merge." Valuations are, in
this context, supermodular if, for all i; j 2 N , vii + vjj  vij + vji (pairs
are more productive than individuals). Now if vii > vki for all k 6= i, and
also vjj > vkj for all k 6= j, then vii + vjj > vij + vji unless i = j. Hence
supermodularity implies a single equilibrium rm.
6 Decentralization
The model we have introduced makes unusally strong assumptions about
the information available to entrepreneurs (they know not only their own
valuations, but also everyone elses). Furthermore, entrepreneurs could only
envision the equilibrium rms and make the correct wage o¤ers if they were
very sophisticated planners and condent that others play their equilibrium
strategies. There are, however, alternative mechanisms that implement the
memberships, organization and payo¤s with knowledge of ones own valu-
ations only, through sequential link formation. One can think of this as a
development process where rms start out small and merge over time, or as
a build-up of subcontracting relationships.)
The (non-directed) network game that corresponds to   is
 
N; V : 2NN ! R,
where R  N N is the endogenous network relation, and
V (R) =
X
i2N
vR(i)i
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is the value population N creates if it is connected by the links in R. (We
adopt the usual notation R (i) = j if (i; j) 2 R.) The interpretation of
R (i) = j is that i is managed by j.
An allocation rule u : N  2NN ! R species how the network value is
apportioned among individuals. We require that u is feasible and consistent
with   setting in the following sense:X
i2C
u (i; R) 
X
i2C
vR(i)i
for all C  N and all R  N  N . I.e. the total allocation to coalition
C  N cannot exceed the value created by C in  . This condition presumes
that individuals who do not belong to C will not contribute to C.
The strongly stable networks with respect to an admissible allocation rule
are those in which no coalition C  N can make all members better o¤ (and
some i 2 C strictly) by severing links involving any of its members, and
adding links between any two members. I.e. network R is strongly stable if,
for all C  N , for all i 2 C and all networks R0 obtainable from R via C
such that u (i; R0) > u (i; R), there exists j 2 C such that u (j; R0) < u (j; R).
NetworkR0 is obtainable fromR if (i; j) 2 R0 and (i; j) =2 R only if fi; jg  C,
and (i; j) 2 R and (i; j) =2 R0 only if fi; jg \ C 6= ?.
Proposition (P9). If s is an equilibrium of  , thenR such that (x; y) 2 R
if and only if x 2 Gy is a strongly stable network with respect to an admissible
allocation rule where u (i; R) = ui (s) for all i 2 N .
Proof. p. 26.
The network game is distinctive in spirit from the non-cooperative for-
malization: rms organize in a decentralized fashion (through voluntary link
formation between workers and managers), rather than by hiring and imposi-
tion of a structure from the top. Hence our equilibrium is stable in the further
sense that its productive relationships could arise through delegated decision
making in rms or subcontracting arrangements or mergers and acquisitions
over time.
7 Conclusion
By introducing a natural type of complementarity, that between workers and
their managers, and a process by which entrepreneurs create rms and imple-
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ment organization designs, we have shown that rms with rich internal pat-
terns of complementary and substitute relationships arise in non-cooperative
or cooperative equilibrium. Firm formation is traditionally approached either
from the "rm creation" (entrepreneurship) or the "rm design" (worker-to-
job matching) side. The labor market is unlike other two-sided markets (men
and women, students and colleges, doctors and hospitals) in that one has a
choice to be a worker or an entrepreneur. In our view, this choice occurs
simultaneously with - rather than before - a workers choice of employer. We
have developed an integrated model in which agents may organize rms based
on the value they expect to create under a "business plan" that encompasses
organization structure and labor-market bids for managerial talent.
Formally, this is a coalition-formation game, where the value of each
coalition depends on a network it adopts. An entrepreneur is uniquely able
to implement a network that covers the opportunity costs of its members
(including his or her own). By resolving occupation choice (worker or en-
trepreneur) through labor market competition for employees, we account for
opportunities as well as opportunity costs. In some cases, the entrepreneur is
the sole member of a rm that is not very protable, since no one else o¤ers a
better-paying job. Much of the economics of entrepreneurship has focused on
personal qualities that a¤ect only opportunity, such as skill (Laussel and Le
Breton [13]), risk attitude (Kihlstrom and La¤ont [11]) and access to wealth
(Legros and Newman [14]). This leaves open why the labor market does
not adequately compensate for such qualities. Our approach suggests that
entrepreneurs can only realize their potential in organizations of a particular
structure that do not yet exist.
8 Proofs
P1
Replacing any ri with an optimal assignment of managers, i.e. ri (j; C) =
h such that vhj  vkj for all k 2 C, can only be benecial, and one may con-
struct opposing strategy proles s i against which it is a strict improvement
over any suboptimal assignment. (Specically, let the person who is subop-
timally assigned join Fi (s).) If i accepts someone elses wage o¤er, then is
payo¤ increases directly with a higher wage.

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P2
Let Fi (s) 6= ?, and suppose i =2 Fi (s). Take any x0 2 Fi (s), and
label k such that ri (x0; Fi (s
)) = k as k = x1, l such that ri (x1; Fi (s
)) = l
as l = x2, etc. Consider the sequence fxtgt2N. Because Fi (s) is nite,
it must be that ri (xt+; Fi (s
)) = xt for some t and some non-negative
integer . Since assignments are hierarchical, and i =2 Fi (s), there exists no
xt 2 Fi (s) such that ri (xt; Fi (s)) = xt. Hence  is not zero. P1i requires
ri (xt+; Fi (s
)) = xt only if vxtxt+  vyxt+ for all y 2 Fi (s). In particular
vxtxt+  vxt+xt+ , which conicts with A3 and A2.

P3
(i) A2 guarantees that vix  vkx for all k 2 N only if there exists no
j 2 N , j 6= i, such that vjx  vkx for all k 2 N . Hence if x 2 Gi, then
x =2 Gj.
(ii) If j 2 Gi, then j 2 Gi is immediate from the denition of Gi.
(iii) If j 2 Gi, then there exists a sequence fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that
k1 2 Gj, k2 2 Gk1... j 2 Gk. Thus vik1 > vk1k1 , vk1k2 > vk2k2 ... vkj > vjj (A2
makes the inequalities strict). Applying A3, we have vii > vji.
Hence it is not the case that vji  vki for all k 2 N , i.e. (a) i =2 Gj. If
i 2 Gj, then vji > vii, which is also a contradiction, so (b) i =2 Gj. If j 2 Gj,
then vjj  vkj for all k 2 N ; in particular vjj  vij, which is at odds with
j 2 Gi  Gi and A2. Thus (c) j =2 Gj. Let x 2 Gj. Then either x 2 Gj or
there exists a sequence fk01; k02; : : : ; k0g  N such that k01 2 Gj, k02 2 Gk01...
x 2 Gk0. In both cases, j 2 Gi implies there is a sequence fl1; l2; : : : ; lg  N
such that j 2 Gi, l1 2 Gj, l2 2 Gl1 ... x 2 Gl. Therefore x 2 Gi. So (d)
Gj  Gi, and by (ii) and (iiic) j is in Gi but not in Gj, so the inclusion is
strict.
(iv) Suppose there exists x 2 Gi \ Gj. Then there are sequences K =
fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that k1 2 Gj, k2 2 Gk1 ... x 2 Gk and K 0 =
fk01; k02; : : : ; k0g  N such that k01 2 Gj0, k02 2 Gk01 ... x 2 Gk0. It follows from
(i) that x 2 Gk \Gk0 6= ? only if k = k0 etc. Therefore K  K 0 or K 0  K,
and thus either i 2 K 0 or j 2 K, i.e. either i 2 Gj or j 2 Gi. By (iiid),
j 2 Gi implies Gj  Gi, and i 2 Gj implies Gi  Gj.
If j; j0 2 Gi, suppose Gj \ Gj0 6= ?, so that Gj  Gj0 or Gj0  Gj0. In the
rst case, j 2 Gi implies i 2 Gj0; in the second case, j0 2 Gi implies i 2 Gj -
either of which contradicts (iiib). We conclude Gj \ Gj0 = ?.
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(v) If j 2 Gi, j 6= i, then Gj  Gi by (iiid). Hence [j2Gi Gj  Gi.
Moreover, Gi  Gi by (ii), which establishes the  part of the equality. If
x 2 Gi and x =2 Gi, then there exists fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that k1 2 Gi,
k2 2 Gk1... x 2 Gk. It follows that x 2 Gk1 for some k1 2 Gi, or x =2 Gi.
Relabeling k1 as j, we have Gi  Gi [
[
j2Gi
Gj.

P4
We show: for all i; j; k 2 N , if j 2 Fi (s) and k 2 Gj, then k 2 Fi (s).
This implies j 2 Fi (s) only if Gj  Fi (s), and we apply P3 to argue
Gj  Fi (s) only if Gj  Fi (s).
Let k 2 Gj, and suppose s is such that j 2 Fi (s) while k 2 Fh (s),
with h 6= i. Since s is an equilibrium, the prot generated by hs employees
cannot be negative:X
x2Fh(s)nh
vrh(x;Fh(s))x  
X
x2Fh(s)nh
wh (x)  0; (3)
else h could strictly improve on uh (s) by o¤ering wh (x) = 0 to all x 2
Fh (s
). If h 2 Fh (s), then
uh (s
) = vrh(h;Fh(s))h +
X
x2Fh(s)nh
vrh(x;Fh(s))x  
X
x2Fh(s)nh
wh (x) : (4)
Suppose i o¤ered every one of hs employees a slightly higher wage:
~wi (x) = w

h (x)+" for all x 2 Fh (s)nh, with " > 0. If h 2 Fh (s), suppose i
also o¤ered h a wage that exceeds the current payo¤: ~wi (h) = uh (s)+". Any
employer-choice function that would reject these o¤ers is not undominated,
hence cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy. (P1ii implies x 2 Fh (s)
only if h o¤ered the highest wage to x in s. After topping the o¤er, i must
be the high bidder and gain x.) We show that it is in fact an improvement
for i to o¤er these wages for some " > 0.
The payo¤ for i when running rm Fi
 
~si; s

 i

= Fi (s
) [ Fh (s) after
increased o¤ers ~wi, with all else equal, is
ui
 
~si; s

 i

= ui (s
) +
X
x2Fh(s)
vri (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
 
X
x2Fh(s)
wh (x) 
X
x2Fh(s)
"
 ui (s) +
X
x2Fh(s)

vri (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
  vrh(x;Fh(s))x

 
X
x2Fh(s)
"(5)
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if h =2 Fh (s), and
ui
 
~si; s

 i

= ui (s
) +
X
x2Fh(s)
vri (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
 
X
x2Fh(s)nh
wh (x)  uh (s) 
X
x2Fh(s)
"
 ui (s) +
X
x2Fh(s)

vri (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
  vrh(x;Fh(s))x

 
X
x2Fh(s)
" (6)
if h 2 Fh (s). Inequalities (5) and (6) derive, respectively, from (3) and (4).
For all x 2 Fh (s),
vri (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
 vrh(x;Fh(s))x;
since Fh (s)  Fi
 
~si; s

 i

. Because si is undominated, P1i implies that the
assignment ri is value-maximizing. Clearly, the maximal valuation for any
x 2 Fh (s) must be at least as large in Fi
 
~si; s

 i

as in Fh (s).
Since k 2 Gj and j =2 Fh (s),
vjk > vrh(k;F h)k
:
On the other hand j 2 Fi (s)  Fi
 
~si; s

 i

, so ri
 
k; Fi
 
~si; s

 i

= j and
vri (k; ~Fi)k
= vjk. Then ui
 
~si; s

 i
  ui (s) if
" =
vjk   vrh(k;Fh(s))k
n+ 1
> 0:
The deviation establishes that k 2 Fh (s) for any h 6= i is not pos-
sible in equilibrium. Thus k 2 Fi (s), and we have demonstrated that
j 2 Fi (s) leads to Gj  Fi (s). Let x 2 Gj and x =2 Gj. Then there
exists fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that k1 2 Gj; k2 2 Gk1 ; : : : ; x 2 Gk. From
j 2 Fi (s) and k1 2 Gj we have k1 2 Fi (s), applying our prior argu-
ment. Similarly, k1 2 Fi (s) and k2 2 Gk1 imply k2 2 Fi (s). Inductively,
k1; k2; : : : ; k 2 Fi (s), and therefore x 2 Fi (s). It follows that j 2 Fi (s)
entails Gj  Fi (s).

P5
Since i 2 Fi (s) by P2 if Fi (s) 6= ?, P4 requires Gi  Fi (s). It
remains to be shown that Fi (s)  Gi, or equivalently N n Gi  N n Fi (s).
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Suppose x 2 N n Gi and x 2 Fi (s). We relabel x as x0 and reconstruct the
sequence fxtgt2N as in the proof of P2. Observe that i 6= xt for any t; else we
would have x 2 Gi. By our prior argument, ri (xt+; Fi (s)) = xt for some
t and integer  > 0, which violates A3 unless ri (xt; Fi (s
)) = xt for some
xt 2 Fi (s) 6= i. But this does not satisfy the hierarchy requirement. Hence
x 2 N n Fi (s), and we have established Fi (s) = Gi.

P6
Follows from P2 and the fact that j 2 Fi (s) only if k 2 Fi (s) such
that j 2 Gk, which is what we have to show. If j 2 Fi (s) and j 2 Gk, but
k 2 F h with h 6= i, then j 2 F h : by P3ii Gk  Gk, and by P4, Gk  F h .
This contradicts the premise j 2 Fi (s).

P7
We construct the equilibrium s as follows. Manager assignments r
are value-maximizing (satisfy P6), and employer choices e select the high-
est wage o¤er (or, in case of a tie, the o¤er from the individual with the
higher direct valuation). The high bid for each i 2 N is w(1) (i) = v(2)i +P
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

, and is made by the person with the highest direct valu-
ation of i, i.e. h such that vhi = v(1)i. The high bid is matched by the person
with the second-highest direct valuation of j, i.e. h0 such that vh0i = v(2)i.
The resulting rms are, for i = 1; : : : ; N , Fi (s) = Gi if i 2 Gi and
Fi (s
) = ? otherwise, which means s is hierarchical. We argue that s
is also Nash. No one can have an incentive to deviate by reorganizing an
e¢ cient equilibrium rm (change ri ). Accepting the highest wage o¤er is
always best for non-entrepreneurs and, given the form of the winning o¤ers,
implies that i becomes an entrepreneur if and only if i 2 Gi. In Fi (s), i adds
at least vii+
P
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

under the manager assignment ri . If i 2 Gi,
then vii = v(1)i, so i can earn more income through contributing to prot in
Fi (s
) than from the highest competing wage o¤er. Conversely, suppose
i =2 Gi, but i turns down the highest wage o¤er to become an entrepreneur.
Because the entrepreneurs income is independent of the wage paid to self,
this scenario is akin to an increase in wage o¤ers. We may therefore conne
ourselves to considering changes in wage o¤ers.
Observe rst that i cannot protably reduce wage o¤ers. Suppose i is
an entrepreneur. Employing j 2 Fi (s) at wage w(1) (j) is strictly protable
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for i, since j 2 Gi and j 2 Gk implies k 2 Gi, so that j is assigned to the
best manager and directly adds v(1)j > v(2)j to the rm Fi (s). Moreover
Gj  Gi, hence j indirectly adds at least
P
x2Gi
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

to Fi (s) as
the best manager for the group Gj. O¤ering less than w(1) (j) loses j to the
previously second-highest bidder and therefore reduces is prot. If i is not
an entrepreneur, then none of is wage o¤ers are accepted, and lowering them
does not change anything for i.
No more can i protably increase wage o¤ers. If i is to benet from raising
o¤ers, they must be accepted and add to membership in Fi (s). Suppose i
attracts the group C from outside Fi (s). Then i must o¤er strictly more
than w(1) (j) to each j 2 C:X
j2C
wi (j) 
X
j2C
w(1)j =
X
j2C
v(2)j +
X
j2C
X
x2Gj
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
j2C
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGj
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

:
Since Fi (s) initially included all ideal managers for its employees, mem-
bers of C can only add value directly or through managing other members of
C. I.e. their contribution to Fi (s) is
P
j2C maxk2Fi(s) vkj. Denote the sub-
set of C with best managers in C by C0  fx 2 C s.t. x 2 Gj with j 2 Cg.
Because Fi (s) already included anyone whose ideal manager is in Fi (s),
all other members of C, i.e. j 2 C n C0, cannot make a direct contribution
greater than v(2)j to Fi (s). The contribution C makes to Fi (s) is therefore
at most: X
j2C0
v(1)j +
X
j2CnC0
v(2)j 
X
j2C
max
k2Fi(s)
vkj:
Because C0  [j2CGj,X
j2C
wi (j) 
X
j2C
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGj
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
j2C0
v(2)j +
X
j2C0
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

+
X
j2CnC0
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGjnC0
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
j2C0
v(1)j +
X
j2CnC0
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGjnC0
 
v(1)x   v(2)x


X
j2C
max
k2Fi(s)
vkj +
X
x2[j2CGjnC0
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

:
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This means i would pay more for C than its members can contribute to
Fi (s
); raising bids is not protable.
Hence individuals are optimizing in all three strategic components in s,
and s is a hierarchical equilibrium.

P8
Any C  N can be partitioned into sets Gi \ C for i 2 N such that
Fi (s
) 6= ? in a given equilibrium of  . (Since Fi (s) = Gi by P5 and
the nonempty Fi (s) partition N .) Hence, to establish
P
i2C maxk2C vki P
i2C ui for all C  N , it is su¢ cient to show that, for any i 2 N with
Fi (s
) 6= ?, X
x2 Gi\C
max
k2C
vkx 
X
x2 Gi\C
ui:
By assumption, for all x 6= i,
ui = v(2)x +
X
y2Gx\C
 
v(1)y   v(2)y

:
For x = i,
ui = v(1)x +
X
y2Gi\C
 
v(1)y   v(2)y

:
Since fGxgx2 Gi partitions Gi nGi by P3v, so that the union of Gx n fig over
x 2 Gi is Gi nGi,X
x2f Ginig\C
ui 
X
x2f Ginig\C
v(2)x +
X
x2f GinGinig\C
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
x2f GinGinig\C
v(1)x +
X
x2Gi\C
v(2)x:
Now, if i =2 Gi \ C, thenX
x2 Gi\C
ux =
X
x2f Ginig\C
ux 
X
x2f GinGig\C
v(1)y +
X
x2Gi\C
v(2)y

X
x2 Gi\C
max
k2C
vkx
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because i =2 Gi\C implies i =2 C by design of the partition: Fi (s) = Gi, and
i 2 Fi (s) by P2, hence i 2 Gi. But then, for all x 2 Gi, maxk2C vkx  v(2)x.
If i 2 Gi \ C, thenX
x2 Gi\C
ux = ui +
X
x2f Ginig\C
ux

X
x2 Gi\C
v(1)x 
X
x2 Gi\C
max
k2C
vkx:

P9
By P8, X
i2C
max
k2C
vki 
X
i2C
ui (s
)
for all C  N , and in particular for any coalition that deviates to induce a
network R0 which is obtainable from R through C. SinceX
i2C
u (i; R0) 
X
i2C
vR0(i)i 
X
i2C
max
k2C
vki
(the rst inequality from feasibility of the allocation u), we haveX
i2C
u (i; R0) 
X
i2C
ui (s
) =
X
i2C
u (i; R) ;
which implies there is no deviation that makes every member of C better o¤
(and some i 2 C strictly).

9 References
References
[1] Alcalde, J., D. Perez-Castrillo (1998). "Hiring Procedures to
Implement Stable Allocations." Journal of Economic Theory 82, 469-
480.
26
[2] Crawford, V.P., E.M. Knoer (1981). "Job Matching with Hetero-
geneous Firms and Workers." Econometrica 49, 437450.
[3] Derks, J.J.M., R.P. Gilles (1995). "Hierarchical Organization Struc-
tures and Constraints on Coalition Formation." International Journal of
Game Theory 24, 147-163.
[4] Dutta, B., J. Masso (1997). "Stability of Matchings when Individuals
Have Preferences over Colleagues." Journal of Economic Theory 75, 464-
475.
[5] Ellickson, B., B. Grodal, S. Scotchmer, W.R. Zame (1999).
"Clubs and the Market." Econometrica 67, 11851217.
[6] Farrell, J., S. Scotchmer (1988). "Partnerships." Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 103, 279297.
[7] Hatfield, J.W., F. Kojima (2005). "Substitutes and Stability for
Matching with Contracts." Working Paper.
[8] Hatfield, J.W., P.R. Milgrom (2005). "Matching with Contracts."
American Economic Review 95, 913-931.
[9] Ichiishi, T. (1977). "Coalition Structure in a Labor-Managed Market
Economy." Econometrica 45, 341-360.
[10] Kelso, A.S., Jr., V.P. Crawford (1982). "Job Matching, Coalition
Formation, and Gross Substitutes." Econometrica 50, 1483-1504.
[11] Kihlstrom, R., J. Laffont (1979). "A General Equilibrium Entre-
preneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion." Journal
of Political Economy 87, 719-748.
[12] Kremer, M. (1993). "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 551-575.
[13] Laussel, D., M. Le Breton (1995) "A General Equilibrium Theory
of Firm Formation Based on Individual Unobservable Skills." European
Economic Review 39, 1303-1319.
[14] Legros, P., A.F. Newman (1996). "Wealth E¤ects, Distribution, and
the Theory of Organization." Journal of Economic Theory 70, 312-341.
27
[15] Ma, J. (2001). "Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility and
Disutility of Co-Workers." Games and Economic Behavior 34, 83-103.
[16] Martinez, R., J. Masso, A. Neme, J. Oviedo (2000) "Single Agents
and the Set of Many-to-One Matchings." Journal of Economic Theory
91, 91-105.
[17] Martinez, R., J. Masso, A. Neme, J. Oviedo (2004) "Single Agents
and the Set of Many-to-One Matchings." International Journal of Game
Theory 33, 115-128.
[18] Pycia, M. (2005). "Many-To-One Matching without Substitutability."
Working Paper.
[19] Rosen, S. (1982). "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earn-
ings." Bell Journal of Economics 13, 311-323.
[20] Roth, A.E. (1984). "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job
Matching." Econometrica 52, 47-57.
[21] Sasaki, H., M. Toda (1996) "Two-Sided Matching Problems with
Externalities." Journal of Economic Theory 70, 93-108.
[22] Sherstyuk, K. (1999). "Multisided Matching Games with Comple-
mentarities." International Journal of Game Theory 28, 489-509.
[23] Sotomayor, M (2004). "Implementation in the Many-to-Many Match-
ing Market." Games and Economic Behavior 46, 199-212.
[24] Zame, W.R. (2007). "Incentives, Contracts, and Markets: A General
Equilibrium Theory of Firms." Econometrica 75, 1453-1500.
28
